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TRENDS in Communist Propaganda 9 Oct 74

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ENERGY

MOSCOW URGES OPEC UNITY, "PRESSURE" ON WESTERN MONOPOLIES

While Moscow had refrained from any substantial original comment on recent criticism of high oil prices by the President and Secretary Kissinger, it had been quick to replay negative reaction from spokesmen for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As late as 5 October, Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic reminded Middle Eastern listeners of calls for reduced oil prices by the President and Secretary Kissinger. But regular Soviet media generally have reverted to doctrinaire explanations of Western agitation for a reduction of oil prices. Thus, Moscow Arabic- and Persian-language broadcasts argue that an "anti-Arab imperialist conspiracy" led by Western oil monopolies is behind the current campaign to reduce oil prices, and commentators urge unity and joint action to "pressure" the monopolies by member-states of OPEC.

"INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLIES"
BEHIND OIL CRISIS

A Moscow broadcast to Iranian listeners on the 3d, arguing that "imperialist companies" in the West were trying to place the "heavy burden" of the capitalist world's oil, inflation, and economic crises on the shoulders of oil-producing countries, noted that OPEC members expressed their opposition to the Washington conference of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund by refusing to attend. The commentary cited the Teheran paper KAYHAN--often quoted recently in Soviet comment for Middle Eastern audiences--to the effect that the OPEC members' national interests "demand that the price of oil not be decreased." The commentary concluded that success in the OPEC struggle against "the common enemy, oil imperialism" or organizations like the World Bank and the IMF, depended on OPEC unity and "pressure on the monopolies through joint efforts."

PRAVDA commentator Peresada on the 4th derided as "untenable" Western press claims that the capitalist world's economic crisis and "so-called energy crisis" had been exacerbated by OPEC oil price increases and export restrictions. He argued that "international monopolies" themselves had fomented the crisis in order to preserve their "superprofits" and monopolize the market and had circulated the "fairytale" that OPEC had exacerbated the West's economic problems when they saw the end of cheap Middle Eastern oil.

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"ECONOMIC WAR"
DECLARED BY U.S.

Illustrative of the much more critical and anti-U.S. stance of Moscow's ostensibly "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress was a 5 October commentary for Arab listeners. It declared flatly that "public opinion in the Middle East believes that the pressure and threats put on the oil-exporting states by the United States indicates in fact a declaration of economic war." The commentator concluded with a veiled suggestion that if such "pressure" continues, the OPEC countries could find themselves "compelled to take whatever measures they think appropriate to protect their legitimate interests." Liberally quoting from Arab newspapers, the commentator noted charges that "American colonialism" sought to weaken the Arab states' position on Middle East issues, undercut the Arabs' international support, and split the "united front" of developing countries and incite them against the Arab states.

By contrast, Moscow's pragmatic approach to detente-related U.S.-Soviet cooperation on energy matters was illustrated by Soviet media treatment of the first meeting in Washington (3-5 October) of the joint U.S.-Soviet commission for cooperation in the field of energy--a commission set up by the 28 June 1974 agreement signed in Moscow during former President Nixon's visit. TASS' positive, straightforward reporting on the commission's first activities completely ignored world and U.S. energy crisis issues, while quoting the Soviet delegation head as praising "successful" cooperation and "mutual benefit" to the two countries through the new bilateral arrangement.

MOSCOW RETICENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ACTION

Soviet media have remained much more reticent and noncommittal, however, in regard to joint international efforts to resolve the oil price conflict between oil-exporting and oil-importing nations, efforts that usually have been Western-initiated. PRAVDA's Peresada vaguely suggested, after referring to "positive trends" at the present stage of international relations, that such trends "dictate the need to establish and comprehensively develop equal economic cooperation among all countries." Current Soviet reportage on the recent Washington IMF session uniformly disparaged it as a "capitalist" conclave aimed against OPEC. Moscow also was consistently negative about the February 1974 Washington energy conference, predicting its failure in advance and stressing Western disarray and distrust.*

* Soviet advance treatment of the earlier U.S.-sponsored energy conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 9-10.

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Soviet media have never given more than very low-level, perfunctory publicity to the idea of a broad energy conference with both communist and noncommunist countries participating.

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USSR - EGYPT

COMMENT MARKING WAR ANNIVERSARY REFLECTS CONTINUED RIFT

In limited comment pegged to the first anniversary of the October 1973 Middle East war, Moscow has conveyed a message of continuing dissatisfaction with key aspects of Egypt's foreign and domestic policies under President Sadat. As on past occasions, Moscow's principal complaints have focused on Egypt's critical attitude toward Soviet military and economic aid, its increased cooperation with the West, and Egyptian economic trends away from socialist policies. Strongly reinforcing this recent expression of Moscow's displeasure with Cairo was the preponderant theme of Soviet material on the war anniversary--the vital necessity of Soviet diplomatic and material support, in the past and the future, for Arab success in the conflict with Israel.

Much of the anniversary commentary reflected continued resentment over Sadat's public criticism, made on several occasions after the war, disparaging the value of Soviet military aid to the Arabs. Sadat had referred, for example, to untimely deliveries and inadequate quantities of military supplies and to the ineffectiveness of Soviet weapons in combat. Soviet sensitivity to such charges was evident in a Moscow radio commentary by A. Timoshkin, broadcast to Arab listeners on 6 October, which praised the Syrian military effusively for having "proved that Soviet military equipment is not inferior to that of the Israeli army," adding that "it is actually superior to it in many aspects."

A two-part Moscow radio commentary by Yuriy Potomov on 4-5 October, titled "Lessons of the October War," also defended the value of Soviet weapons, using a transparent polemical device to make its point by selectively quoting Sadat against himself but mentioning his name only when citing the references approvingly. Thus, noting that Sadat had recently stated that "the crossing of the canal and the October war were possible due to Soviet weapons," Potomov observed further that "even the most uninformed on military matters" must realize Soviet deliveries of weapons and training in their use did not begin the day the war started, adding "how insipid to allege, as some have done," that the USSR did not give the Arabs modern weapons, that it prevented the Arabs from carrying out certain military operations, and that it wanted to maintain a state of "no war, no peace."

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Soviet concern over Egypt's increased diplomatic and economic ties with the West since the war--as well as a residue of resentment over the relatively small Soviet role played in the disengagement negotiations--was also evident in anniversary comment. The Potomov radio commentary on 4-5 October, for example, probably had Secretary Kissinger and his contacts with President Sadat in mind when it asked rhetorically whether the "positive changes" of the October war were "all the result of activity of some statesmen in some countries--men who are capable of working miracles and changing from the helpers of the aggressors into the friends of those subjected to the aggression." Asserting that such a judgment would be "superficial and untrue," Potomov reminded his listeners of other factors, such as the oil embargo and Arab "solidarity." His predictable main conclusion, however, was that the "fundamental preconditions" for the Arab states' successes in the October war were their long-time "progressive domestic policies," combined with foreign policies of close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The final lesson for Arab audiences to remember from Potomov's and other Soviet commentators' analyses was explicitly that future Arab successes would depend on the same domestic and foreign preconditions.

PEKING Peking conveyed a decidedly anti-Soviet slant in marking the anniversary, giving only perfunctory attention to the Arab conflict with Israel and its U.S. backer, while focusing on the October war as a great victory by Egypt against Soviet control and interference. Lengthy NCNA articles on 4 and 6 October dredged up allegations of Soviet perfidy since the 1967 war and hailed moves by Sadat to check Soviet efforts to "sabotage" last October's attack. They charged that Brezhnev had worked closely with former President Nixon to impede the Arabs' advance in the Sinai and that Kosygin's October 1973 visit to Cairo was part of a heavyhanded Soviet effort to stop the fighting. Reviewing strains in Egyptian-Soviet relations over the past year regarding arms supplies, repayment of debts, bilateral visits and propaganda attacks, the Chinese lauded Sadat's efforts to diversify Egypt's sources of aid, noting especially Cairo's closer ties with other Arab nations, the reestablishment of relations with Washington, and the rise of U.S. influence in the area at Soviet expense.

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G D R 25 T H A N N I V E R S A R Y

BREZHNEV, HONECKER SPEECHES EMPHASIZE BLOC SOLIDARITY

The 25th anniversary of the GDR on 7 October was the occasion for strong reaffirmations by Honecker of East Germany's solidarity with Moscow--a status newly proclaimed in a revised GDR constitution which went into effect on that date--and for tributes by the SED leader to Brezhnev, who was the star of the festivities. Brezhnev got more lavish praise than at the last comparable ceremonial occasion in East Berlin, the Eighth SED Congress in June 1971. Neither Brezhnev nor Honecker mentioned the proposed European and world communist party conferences in their major friendship rally speeches on the 6th. Brezhnev's fairly lengthy, though standard, discussion of the Chinese was preceded by a brief, more restrained allusion to Peking by Honecker in his opening speech.

HONECKER While the new GDR constitution, which eliminates language reflecting East German dedication to eventual all-German unification, was not mentioned by either principal, the GDR's new unqualified identity as a socialist state allied with Moscow was clearly underscored by Honecker. Thus, after declaring that the GDR's development was inconceivable without its alliance with the Soviet Union, the SED leader added that, "being an integral part of the community of socialist states, our GDR now belongs to the strongest and most influential power in the world, to the power of socialism which is firmly rooted on the three continents of our planet." In stating that the GDR is prepared to further develop relations with capitalist states, including the FRG, on the basis of sovereignty and equality, Honecker stressed that "the centerpiece" of East German foreign policy would continue to be the strengthening of its alliance with the USSR and the other states of the socialist community. In this connection, he underscored the close connection between the GDR's industrial successes and CEMA economic integration.

In addition to the expected tributes to Brezhnev in his Karl Marx Order award speech on the 6th, Honecker also began his rally speech the same day with a lengthy eulogy of the Soviet leader. Welcoming Brezhnev as "our good friend and comrade," Honecker praised him as "the envoy of the Soviet people which . . . through the great peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress is again thoroughly changing the world." While thus firmly supporting Moscow's detente policy, Honecker did not reiterate the principle of "coordination" of foreign policy by the socialist states--a principle which Moscow and its

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orthodox allies have stressed since the July 1973 Crimea conference and which Brezhnev cited in his speech at the East Berlin rally. Honecker did, however, mention coordination of foreign policy in his GDR anniversary article published in PRAVDA on the 4th.

Honecker delivered a brief criticism of the PFC for allegedly aiding the antideutsche forces and supporting NATO and the EC. He had registered a similarly low keyed criticism of Peking in a Warsaw speech in June. On both that occasion and the present one he avoided the "Maoist" epithet used by both Poland's Gierek and Brezhnev, respectively.

BREZHNEV As he had done in Poland in July, Brezhnev answered the lavish praise accorded him by his host with only a brief, standard tribute in return. Thus, in his rally speech the Soviet leader attributed the GDR's economic achievements to the two-million-strong SED "led by the true son of its people, steeled antifascist, and prominent figure in the international communist movement, Erich Honecker." He included a more generous reference to Ulbricht than Honecker had made, listing the late SED leader with such "hallowed" names as Pieck and Grotewohl who, he said, had written "glorious pages" in the history of German socialism and would "forever remain in the memory of their descendants." Honecker, by contrast, had merely listed Ulbricht with a large number of "unforgettable" German revolutionaries of the past.

Brezhnev reminded his hosts that it was "the concerted efforts of the fraternal socialist countries," embodied in the Warsaw Pact organization, that had frustrated alleged imperialist attempts to "crush" the young East German state and paved the way for official international recognition of the GDR. He went on to stress the importance of the Warsaw Pact countries' "coordination of political efforts in the international arena" in strengthening peace and detente.

In contrast to his 21 July speech before the Polish Sejm, Brezhnev included some critical references to the Chinese leadership in his remarks. Terming the 1949 revolutionary victory "a great event in the life of China," the Soviet leader attacked "the Maoist leaders'" for their current split from the other socialist countries and for their opposition to detente. He called on "the Chinese people themselves" to change these policies. As in his 24th congress speech in 1971, Brezhnev declared that the USSR would "continue exerting efforts to normalize relations" with the PRC.

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BREZHNEV, HONECKER ON
FRG RELATIONS

Brezhnev in his major address on the 6th took the unusual step of discussing at considerable length Moscow's relations with Bonn, making it clear that the Soviet leadership wished to see continued improvement in East-West German relations. Asserting that the policy of "actively developing relations" between the FRG and the socialist states "already justifies itself in practice," Brezhnev pointed out that agreements with the FRG of recent years "are being constantly filled with real content" and that "we are prepared" to continue this policy and "presume the other side" is also interested. He then went on to say that Chancellor Schmidt was expected soon in Moscow on an official visit and favorably noted statements by FRG Government leaders on the "continuity" of Bonn's foreign policy. At the same time Brezhnev took an indirect swipe at Bonn over the establishment of the FRG Federal Environmental Office in West Berlin, deplored the move as an attempt "to get special advantages counter to the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin," and declaring that all the agreements with the FRG were too important to be made the object of a "political game."

Honecker, who spoke before Brezhnev on the 6th, referred only briefly to relations with Bonn, but expressed the optimistic opinion that there were "possibilities" for achieving "additional positive results." It was on 27 September that the GDR People's Chamber adopted the law removing all references in the 1968 constitution to a united German nation or people and to future reunification of the two German states. According to the new "socialist constitution," which became effective as of the 25th anniversary, the GDR is now a "socialist state of workers and peasants," "forever and irrevocably allied with the USSR." Honecker managed to avoid any reference to "reunification" or "nation" in his remarks on the constitutional changes on the 27th. In his anniversary address on the 6th, however, he paid some deference to the East German people's interests in and feelings for its historical traditions, declaring that the GDR has preserved "all the good ideas" of German history and that "we are preserving and treasuring this great heritage."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

BELGRADE MAINTAINS COOL ATTITUDE IN COMINFORMIST AFFAIR

Belgrade has given its first indication that it may have received some assurances from the bloc countries involved in the recent "Cominformist" conspiracy that such activities would not be permitted in the future. Meanwhile, at least one Yugoslav newspaper has criticized Moscow's public handling of the issue, strongly implying that the latter had meddled in Yugoslav affairs.

The press spokesman for the foreign affairs secretariat, Milan Zupan, in a briefing for newsmen on 3 October, acknowledged that the "party leaderships of certain countries" had been "informed" by the "LCY leadership" about the trial of the Cominformist group. As a result of the contacts, he said, Yugoslavia had been given "assurances" that "no emigre activity against Yugoslavia will be allowed." Zupan avoided identifying the three countries allegedly involved--the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He did, however, go on record to deny Western press reports that Belgrade had declared persona non grata "three diplomatic representatives of socialist countries" in connection with the affair. That the contacts took place at the party level--and were subsequently announced by a government official--underscored Tito's intention not to allow the affair or Yugoslavia's reaction to endanger state relations with the bloc countries involved.

Indeed, Zupan's remarks seemed designed to portray Belgrade as approaching the problem with diplomatic equanimity. This follows the pattern in the Yugoslav press since Tito's 12 September revelation of the arrest and trial of the group, which has emphasized the need for vigilance against hostile forces but has avoided inflaming the issue or pointing the finger at Moscow. An exception has been Ljubljana's DELO, which on 28 September openly criticized Moscow's first public response to the affair and in a separate article criticized in a thinly veiled manner Moscow's general attitude toward Yugoslavia.

THE DELO ARTICLES

The first article scored a 27 September PRAVDA commentary which had concentrated primarily on discrediting Western press reports about Soviet military intentions toward Yugoslavia and had mentioned the group's arrest and trial only as an aside. DELO pointed out that PRAVDA, "which undoubtedly expresses the official position

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of the Soviet leadership," was guilty of avoiding "the very essence of the problem" because it "does not all mention" that the group involved were "Cominformists" and that they were "linked with anti-Yugoslav emigrants abroad."

The second DELO article avoided mentioning the Soviet Union or any other country by name but was clearly aimed at the alleged foreign supporters of the group. Using Tito's call for greater vigilance against hostile forces as a springboard, DELO criticized those who denigrate Yugoslavia's own brand of socialism and contend that "it is a veritable crime not to copy" the so-called "ideal societies." It particularly criticized "the embassy of a great foreign state" for indirectly attacking Yugoslavia through the propaganda it distributes. While the propaganda materials "never contain an ill word about Yugoslavia," DELO pointed out, they draw attention to negative phenomena, such as electricity shortages and nationalities problems. The "message of this polemic," DELO concluded, is clearly to criticize the Yugoslav system, adding that "it is not a long way from this to extending assistance to those of our emigrants abroad who want the social system changed."

Whether the DELO articles have been published with the regime's approval is hard to say. Despite the Federal Government's efforts to increase control over the provincial press, DELO, organ of the Slovene Socialist Alliance, has maintained a degree of independence. Neither of the articles has been replayed by the media in Belgrade.

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INDOCHINA

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT FORMALIZES PRG CALL FOR THIEU'S OUSTER

Vietnamese communists have given the official imprimatur of a PRG statement to the call--first revived by Hanoi in August--for Thieu's overthrow and replacement by an administration willing to comply with the Paris agreement. Giving added impetus to the demand, the 8 October government statement pledged that when Thieu is replaced the PRG will be ready to engage in "serious negotiations" with a new administration to arrive at a "speedy settlement" of South Vietnam's affairs. Since the revival of the issue of Thieu's ouster in mid-August, for the first time since the Paris accord, low-level propaganda has continued to lend support to the "people's" move to oust Thieu, and has occasionally even raised the issue of negotiations after he is gone.*

Since the Paris agreement, the PRG has generally limited its government statements on Vietnam to major policy demarcations such as the 22 March 1974 six-point proposal--the last previous government statement--or linked them to significant events such as the first anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement. Why the government statement was released at this time is not clear, although it may reflect a communist desire to authoritatively record their position in anticipation of the upcoming visit to Moscow by Secretary Kissinger. Prior to former President Nixon's visit to Moscow in June this year and Secretary Kissinger's trip to Peking last November, Hanoi and the PRG appeared to be attempting to focus international attention on their complaints through high-level official statements and authoritative media comment.

The PRG statement reiterated in standard fashion charges of U.S.-Saigon "sabotage" of the Paris agreement, U.S. "involvement and interference" in South Vietnamese affairs, and escalation of the war through pacification and "nibbling" operations. The statement took particular note of the "impossible" life of the people ruled by the Saigon regime, portraying the many political, economic, and social woes allegedly inflicted on them by the Thieu administration. While the media have never been reticent in passing judgement on what they see as shortcomings of life in the GVN, official statements

* For background on the latest call for Thieu's overthrow, see the TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 14-17 and the TRENDS of 28 August 1974, page 13.

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have not ordinarily been the vehicle for such detailed reminders as provided in the current statement. According to the statement, the people "can bear this no longer" and this accounts for a "movement that has erupted violently" in the South to gain redress for these supposed grievances, for national concord and reconciliation, for implementation of the Paris agreement, and for the overthrow of Thieu. In addition to expressing strong support for this movement, the statement issued a series of "firm demands" for realizing the "speedy settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam," including the demand for the "overthrow of Nguyen Van Thieu and his gang who constitute the main obstacle to the solution of the political issues in South Vietnam at present, and the setting up in Saigon of an administration that wishes peace and national concord and is willing to implement the Paris agreement."

STATEMENTS UNDERLINE KHIEU SAMPHAN'S ROLE IN CAMBODIAN FRONT

The increasingly prominent position of RGNU Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan in the Cambodian Front leadership was underscored in recent days with the release of a series of four appeals in his name and an interview with him offering the first authoritative Front statement on the upcoming UN General Assembly debate on Cambodia. While Khieu Samphan has issued such appeals in the past--his last one almost a year ago dealt with the dry season offensive--a series of directives such as the current appeals for greater resistance to Lon Nol normally would have been attributed also to other Front ministers, Hou Youn and Hu Nim. Similarly, Khieu Samphan's comments on the UN representation issue in his 27 September AKI interview impinged upon Prince Sihanouk's traditional role as the leading Front spokesman on foreign policy issues. Sihanouk did not issue his first statement on this year's UN debate until eight days after the Khieu Samphan interview.

The four appeals, dated 27 and 29 September and 1 and 3 October, were addressed, respectively, to four different audiences--students, soldiers, monks, and government personnel still under Lon Nol's rule--and seemed designed to capitalize on recent unease in Phnom Penh stemming from the decline in U.S. aid and stringent economic reforms recently undertaken by the Phnom Penh government. Thus, while praising the present military situation in general terms and reaffirming Front determination to fight until its five points are achieved,

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Khieu Samphan focused on the newly volatile Phnom Penh political situation, stating that the people have launched a "general uprising" against Lon Nol rule and that the present situation in Cambodia has entered a "new stage." Emphasizing popular dissatisfaction with the economic measures, which have devalued the currency and led to tremendous price increases, the appeals said that Lon Nol's lack of territory and resources and the decline in U.S. aid necessitated such steps. Asserting repeatedly that an end to U.S. aid would bring the immediate collapse of the regime, the defense minister added that "the U.S. imperialists themselves face immense economic crises" and "are in no position to help their puppets." The 27 September appeal also took note of the recent return to Phnom Penh of Lon Nol's controversial brother Lon Non, stating that the latter had "laid bare his fascist nature" by allegedly ordering the disbanding of the Cambodian teachers' association last month.

In his interview on the United Nations, Khieu Samphan strove to play up the Front's stature--repeating claims of territorial control, popular support, and international backing--and to portray the Lon Nol regime as a pathetic dependent of the United States. He was cautiously optimistic regarding the outcome of this year's debate, though he warned against the continuing "deceptive maneuvers" of the United States.

Sihanouk's statement on 5 October, as reported by NCNA on the 8th, buttressed Khieu Samphan's stature in the course of rebutting the charge that the RGNU represents a government in exile. He played up Khieu Samphan's position as a Front leader both within Cambodia and in foreign affairs, stating that "the Americans themselves recognize that Mr. Khieu Samphan, head of our government inside Cambodia, is a remarkable figure in Cambodia and in the international arena."

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NGUYEN HUU THO LEADS NFLSV/PRG DELEGATION IN EAST EUROPE, MPR

Recent visits by NFLSV/PRG leader Nguyen Huu Tho to four East European states and Mongolia continued a world tour begun a year ago to express thanks for support received during the Vietnam war. Tho had visited China, the Soviet Union, and the East European members of the ICCS--Hungary and Poland--during November and December 1973, and he was in North Korea late this August.* Following last year's pattern, the Tho delegation has signed agreements for aid to the PRG in the coming year in each of the countries visited. Tho has now gone on to visit Syria and Iraq; he had visited several African countries as well as Yugoslavia in September 1973.

EAST GERMANY During Nguyen Huu Tho's 5-11 September stay in East Germany, GDR State Council Chairman Willi Stoph hosted the South Vietnamese at traditional receptions, dinners, and rallies, represented the GDR in the official talks, and signed the joint communique on the visit. An aid agreement with the Germans, signed on the 9th by PRG Minister Nguyen Van Hieu and Deputy Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Gerhard Weiss, was briefly described in the final communique as providing for nonrefundable economic aid to the PRG in 1975. Hieu also signed the aid agreements concluded on the other stops on the trip.

Remarks by Tho and Stoph at a 5 September arrival dinner set forth basic views which were repeated in the other major addresses during the visit. The texts of their remarks were published by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, but the excerpts published by Hanoi and PRG media focused on criticism of the United States and Saigon and omitted Stoph's references to detente. Tho stressed that the present unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam was due to U.S. "interference and aggression," denied Washington charges that all parties to the Paris agreement have violated it, and criticized President Ford for stating that he would follow the policies of the former administration. Stoph directed his criticism at Saigon for violating the agreement "with U.S. support"--a formulation also used by the German side in the joint communique. While thus stopping

* Nguyen Huu Tho's visit to China is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 November 1973, pages 14-17, and 28 November 1973, pages 14-15; his visit to Poland in the 12 December 1973 TRENDS, page 15; his visit to Hungary in the 19 December TRENDS, page 21; and his visit to the Soviet Union in the TRENDS of 19 December 1973, pages 15-16, and 4 January 1974, pages 4-6.

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short of the harsher Vietnamese indictment of the United States, the Germans went beyond the stand taken by East Europeans during Tho's visits to Poland and Hungary last year, when they criticized "imperialist" support for Saigon without mentioning the United States.

Tho met with SED First Secretary Erich Honecker on the 9th and, according to a cryptic VNA report, the two sides discussed "a number of important problems concerning the situation in South Vietnam and the GDR on which the two sides held identical points of view." The East Berlin radio account of the meeting gave more detail on the exchange, reporting that Tho paid tribute to the USSR and other socialist states for warding off aggression and strengthening the South Vietnamese "liberated areas." Honecker, according to the radio, praised the contributions to socialism, peace, and detente by the 24th CPSU Congress and the socialist community's coordinated foreign policy.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal, acting for ailing President Svoboda, hosted and held talks with the South Vietnamese delegation during its 11-16 September visit to Czechoslovakia. The delegation also met with party chief Gustav Husak and concluded an agreement on free economic assistance for the PRG in 1975. RUDE PRAVO's accounts of toasts at the welcoming banquet on 11 September indicated that Strougal only indirectly criticized the United States in a reference to Saigon "and its allies"; the paper summarized the portion of Tho's remarks on the situation in South Vietnam, eliminating any direct reference to the United States. The joint communique on the visit, however, put Prague on record as condemning the Saigon Administration, "relying on the support of the United States." The South Vietnamese, in the communique in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere on the tour, directed criticism primarily at the United States, rather than Saigon.

ALBANIA The South Vietnamese delegation was warmly welcomed by an impressive array of party and state officials when it arrived in Tirana on 16 September. During the visit, which concluded on the 20th, the delegation was hosted by Chairman of the People's Assembly Presidium Haxhi Lleshi and received by party First Secretary Enver Hoxha. As would be expected, Lleshi joined Tho in speeches denouncing the U.S. role in Indochina and went on to single out China for praise and to criticize the "two imperialist superpowers" and detente. Vietnamese media reports on the visit predictably quoted extensively from the anti-American

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passages, but omitted Lleshi's references to the PRC and his allusions to the Soviet Union. In the joint communique at the conclusion of the visit, the Albanians joined with the PRG in charging that the United States was the "chief culprit" responsible for the situation in South Vietnam. As in the earlier stops on Tho's tour, the communique noted that a nonrefundable aid agreement for 1975 had been concluded.

BULGARIA The Bulgarians were more restrained than Tho's other East European allies in backing PRG complaints about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Thus, speeches by the delegation's host, party First Secretary and State Council President Todor Zhivkov, critically noted the historical U.S. role in Vietnam before the Paris peace agreement but referred only to current actions by "external imperialist forces" without mentioning the United States. The Bulgarian side in the joint communique similarly only condemned "imperialist forces" aiding Saigon. Vietnamese accounts of the communique included the standard statement that an agreement on nonrefundable economic aid for 1975 had been signed. The text of the communique published in the 25 September RABOTNICHESKO DELO, however, did not include the specific qualification on nonrepayment, referring simply to an agreement on economic assistance. Tho's official visit in Bulgaria was from 20 through 24 September, but the delegation vacationed on the Black Sea coast for several days before leaving for their next stop in Ulaanbaatar.

MONGOLIA Party First Secretary and Chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural Presidium Tsedenbal hosted the South Vietnamese delegation during its 30 September-4 October stay in Mongolia. Speeches by Tho and Tsedenbal followed the pattern set in most of Eastern Europe, with Tho placing the primary blame for the "tense" situation in South Vietnam upon the United States and Tsedenbal criticizing the Saigon administration, which he said relies on the "support of the U.S. imperialists." The two sides signed an aid agreement for 1975 and 1976, described in the joint communique as "gratuitous."

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CHINA

PRC UN SPEECH HAILS THIRD WORLD, RIDICULES U.S.-USSR DETENTE

China's chief UN delegate Chiao Kuan-hua in his 2 October address to the General Assembly not unexpectedly reviewed the international scene in the framework of "three worlds," hailing the successes of the Third World against the superpowers of the "first world."* He asserted that the past year has seen the Third World emerge as the "main force" in the revolutionary struggle against the superpowers.

While Chiao typically was much more critical of the Soviet Union than the United States, this year's speech differed notably in regard to superpower relationships from the one he delivered last year at the UNGA. Thus, while in 1973 he displayed concern over such results of detente as the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, this year he pictured people throughout the world as "seeing through" detente. He remarked that it was after the "stack of" agreements at the second U.S.-Soviet summit that the Middle East war broke out and after "more agreements" at the third summit that the "Cyprus events" occurred. The Soviet Union was accused of hawking the "quack medicine" of detente, and criticized for its use of "empty talk" on disarmament to cover arms expansion, and for its expansionist ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, Cyprus, the Balkans and South Asia.

In pointing up the Third World victories of the past year, Chiao devoted special attention to the use of raw materials as weapons. He claimed that the oil weapon had opened up a new dimension in the Third World struggle, one which "far exceeds the scope of the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle." Showing some sensitivity to the problems caused non-oil producing Third World states, Chiao noted that "ways should be sought" to resolve their difficulties.

Without mentioning the United States, Chiao rejected the recent, tougher line on oil-pricing. Asserting only that "some people" say that current economic difficulties are caused by high oil prices, Chiao attacked this "specious argument" and supported

* A period of increasing Chinese attention to and support for the Third World countries was climaxed last April by Politburo member Teng Hsiao-ping's speech to the UNGA special session. See the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.

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efforts by developing nations to control their national resources as a basic challenge to the old economic order of "exploitation and plunder." While Peking media have not explicitly mentioned remarks on oil pricing by the President and Secretary Kissinger, Chiao apparently was referring to those remarks when he admonished that "To fly into a rage is futile. To bluff is also futile."

Though duly calling attention to recently heightened Chinese warnings over the "danger of war" stemming from U.S.-Soviet competition, Chiao carefully refrained from saying that the danger had become worse over the past year, asserting only that "in our view, at least one cannot say it is less." He also added a reference to Mao's dictum that "revolution," not war, represents the main trend in the world today.

While restating Peking's tough preconditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference and advocating the development of "necessary and independent" defense capabilities by non-superpower states, Chiao expanded on Peking's recently displayed flexibility regarding nuclear-free zones by explicitly supporting for the first time separate proposals by Iran and Pakistan for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia. Peking's new openness on nuclear-free zones is obviously designed to deflect Soviet criticism of Chinese intransigence on general world disarmament, and Chiao's position on the Pakistani proposal also serves to put India, with its new nuclear capability, in an awkward position.

On other issues, Chiao:

- + Offered Peking's most explicit acknowledgment that the Cyprus crisis derived from Greek-Turkish hostility on the island as well as from superpower competition, and alleged that the USSR is trying to use the crisis to expand its control in the Balkans.
- + Reaffirmed Peking's belief in the need for armed struggle for African liberation, warning specifically that the new Portuguese government may not abide by its promises of decolonization and that Soviet neocolonialism is a new danger to the African liberation movements.
- + Restated the PRC's past positions on the Middle East, Sikkim, Korea, Cambodia, and Vietnam, devoting special attention to withdrawal of UN troops from Korea, Cambodian insurgent admission to the United Nations, and to his call for an invitation to the PRG to send an observer to the General Assembly.

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KOREA

PYONGYANG EMPHASIZES SUPPORT FOR STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH

Two recent speeches by Kim Il-song, on 24 September and 1 October, and a 5 October NODONG SINMUN editorial illustrate revived high-level North Korean public support for the "revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people." This extensive public treatment of the issue--coming when the North-South dialog is at a "virtual rupture," as Pyongyang has noted several times lately--follows a hiatus of several years during which references in DPRK media to North Korean involvement in the South's struggle were mostly limited to standard, muted formulations. The current references continue to stress the Southern origin of the struggle and deny DPRK instigation.

In his 24 September speech to a group of Koreans from Japan, Kim noted that negotiations with the South would be fruitless if Seoul continued on the "road of reaction." He called on the people of the South to "more valiantly come out to the struggle for the democratization of South Korean society," which he said was necessary for reunification. Northern support for such a struggle, he insisted, was neither interference in the internal affairs of South Korea nor "intended to instigate . . . revolution," but was rather a "noble national duty" to further reunification. In discussing the well-springs of the struggle in the South and Northern support for it, Kim denied that the North did--or could--"export" revolution. One of the tasks given to Chongnyon (the North Korean support organization in Japan), Kim reminded his audience, was to "actively support the democratic movement of the South Korean people," but he cautioned that Pyongyang did not approve of terrorist acts against individuals, such as the 15 August assassination attempt on ROK President Pak Chong-hui by a young Korean resident of Japan. What is needed, said Kim, is not the elimination of a particular person but the change of an entire social system.

The 5 October NODONG SINMUN editorial stated that it is now important to strengthen the revolutionary forces in South Korea "to firmly prepare the internal forces for the reunification of the country." Echoing Kim's speech on 24 September, the editorial rationalized DPRK support for the struggle in the South as being not "interference in the internal affairs" of the South but part of the solution to an internal question by people of "one and the same blood." The editorial also noted that Kim's 1 October speech at

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a rally for Syrian President al-Asad had "reclarified" the North's stand of "actively supporting and encouraging the democratic movement of the southern Korean people." While the speech was actually devoted more to the issues of U.S. troop withdrawal and the convening of a great national congress, the editorial drew attention to those sections dealing with Northern support for the struggle in the South, repeating Kim's pledge that the North would always render "active assistance . . . with might and main" to the struggle in the South.

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ARGENTINA

SOVIET, CUBAN MEDIA CONDEMN TERRORISM, SUPPORT PERON REGIME

The recent increase in terrorist activity in Argentina has evoked a flurry of warnings and denunciations by the Argentine Communist Party (PCA) of rightwing threats against the Peronist Government. Soviet and Cuban reportage and comment have generally echoed their warnings. However, while Havana's PRENSA LATINA has openly referred to rumors that the rightwing terrorist organization, the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), allegedly has connections with the Peron regime, Moscow has not done so. Both Havana and Moscow continue to reflect confidence the Peronists will survive. And both have for the most part followed the line of the PCA, including support for the government of Peron's widow, denunciations of terrorism, and warnings against a Chilean-style coup backed by the U.S. CIA.*

SOVIET COVERAGE Soviet coverage of statements and warnings against Argentine terrorists carried in the PC's weekly NUESTRA PALABRA was capped on 4 October by PRAVDA's publication of a TASS interview with PCA Secretary General Geronimo Arnedo Alvarez. Arnedo suggested as a major cause of the "rapid activation of reaction" in Argentina since 1 July the gestures by the Peronists toward the development of "business-like" relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries. Arnedo claimed that opposition to such steps led to the current "real conspiracy" against the Peronist regime. The PCA leader was quoted as saying that "native imperialists" were being aided by "hundreds of CIA agents" who once worked in Chile and that the only defense was a "patriotic front" of Argentine progressive forces.

The 4 October report echoed earlier Soviet coverage of Argentina. Even before Peron's death a Konstantin Geneyvandov commentary in PRAVDA on 17 June had warned that "ultrarightist circles," acting in unison with the CIA and U.S. monopolies, wanted to create an atmosphere of chaos that would "prepare the soil" for a change of regime. In an initial commentary after Peron's death, Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress on 3 July told Argentines that "oligarchy and imperialism" now might try to use the "Chilean

* For an examination of the previous change in attitude of the PCA and the Soviet media toward Peronism, see the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 18-19.

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recipe" to undermine the progress made by Peronism and noted that the PCA had joined with other "democratic forces" in declaring "complete support" for the administration of Mrs. Peron.

As terrorism increased during the next three months, the Soviet media attacked not only rightwing extremists but also the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), which was labeled "Trotskyite" and said to be infiltrated by CIA agents-provocateurs. In a Moscow domestic service commentary on 26 August, Valentin Mashkin referred to NUESTRA PALABRA's assertion that the "evil part" played by the ERP paralleled the earlier role of leftwing extremists in Chile. However, Malenkin concluded, as has other Soviet comment, with the confident prediction that the Peronist government would survive and that Argentina's foreign policy would remain unchanged.

CUBAN COMMENT The most authoritative Cuban statement on recent events in Argentina was a David Nunez Segura commentary on the Matanzas domestic service on 5 October. Nunez Segura stated that the Argentine rightists, who could not "hide the claws" of the CIA, were embarked upon a "path of jungle terrorism" resembling the CIA activities in Chile. The Argentine Anti-communist Alliance, Nunez alleged, was "recruited, organized and financed" by "North American imperialists" who were determined to set back the development of Argentina. He urged Argentines to organize rapidly to avoid a repeat of the Chilean experience.

Nunez Segura did not criticize the Argentine government, but recent PRENSA LATINA reports of NUESTRA PALABRA articles seem to hint at increasing government laxity in suppressing rightist terrorism. Thus, on 2 October PRENSA LATINA reported that the communist weekly "doubts the credibility" of Interior Minister Alberto Rocamora when he denied that "para-police groups" had been involved in murders; and a 25 September report warned that there was a plot "to either control or overthrow" the government. Soviet reports, by contrast, have not mentioned the AAA by name and have refrained from connecting the government with terrorism.

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USSR

KOSYGIN'S STATUS IN LEADERSHIP BOOSTED, THEN DEFLATED

The public image of the Brezhnev-Kosygin relationship has fluctuated in recent weeks as each leader has been accorded, or arrogated to himself, a public role or prestige honor normally associated with the other. Kosygin's status seemed to be boosted by a late September announcement of the publication of his collected speeches--an honor thus far accorded only to Brezhnev and Suslov among the present collective leaders. Soon after, however, his status was clearly deflated by Brezhnev's address on economic policy to the 1-2 October session of the Council of Ministers. This is only the second time since the 1964 separation of party and government leaderships that Brezhnev has addressed the Council of Ministers, and his domination of the proceedings on this occasion was much more pronounced than on the earlier occasion in mid-1970.

KOSYGIN SPEECHES PUBLISHED

The publication of a collection of Kosygin speeches and articles covering the entire period since Kosygin became a national figure in 1939 was announced in the 20 September PRAVDA. Unlike the announcement of Suslov's collection that appeared on the eve of his 70th birthday in 1972, the Kosygin announcement is unconnected with any ceremonial occasion or specific personal achievement. Kosygin's 70th birthday, on 21 February 1974, had passed with no indication of any intent to publish his works. The present decision puts Kosygin one up on Podgornyy, who outranks him in the hierarchy and whose 70th birthday in February 1973 had similarly passed with no publication of his works.

BREZHNEV SPEECH

PRAVDA's 3 October account of the 1-2 October council session indicated that Brezhnev had delivered a "long speech" which analyzed fulfillment of the current five-year plan and defined the tasks for its completion. At the council meeting reported in the 2 June 1970 PRAVDA, Kosygin had appeared in charge of the session, opening the meeting with a "report" on the outlines of the new five-year plan then being prepared. Brezhnev had followed with a "long speech," but PRAVDA did not report any of Brezhnev's comments nor even indicate the subject of his speech. By contrast, the 3 October 1974 PRAVDA reported that Brezhnev's "long speech" analyzing the five-year plan had opened the meeting, carried five paragraphs on what Brezhnev said--which constituted the bulk of PRAVDA's report--and only noted at the end that Kosygin had also delivered a "speech" summing up the discussion,

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dwelling on important economic problems and "especially stressing the great significance of the tasks set in Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's speech."

Brezhnev's action--as in 1970--appeared aimed at underscoring his call for an increased party role in running the economy made at the preceding December plenum. In his speech Brezhnev pointed out shortcomings in the work of some of Kosygin's ministries and made proposals to improve economic efficiency. In line with his December plenum attribution of equal weight to "mobilizing the widest masses" and improving economic leadership, he gave great credit for economic successes to the campaign for socialist competition--which appears to be one of his own main contributions to economic policy. In his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech, Kosygin had credited Brezhnev personally with proposing the 1973 socialist competition campaign.

KOSYGIN ASSISTANT KILLED

During September Kosygin suffered a personal blow with the death of his longtime senior aid, A.K. Gorchakov, in an auto accident. PRAVDA's obituary on 13 September indicated that onetime textile industry official Gorchakov had become head of Kosygin's secretariat in 1942 and had continued in this post until his death 32 years later.

NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECISIONS ON IDEOLOGY

Two important decisions in the field of ideology were adopted in late August: a Central Committee decree censuring the Belorussian party organization for neglect of ideological work and the belated naming of a chief editor for the Central Committee's top theoretical journal KOMMUNIST. Though the meaning and relationship of these two simultaneous decisions is still unclear, the very fact of their adoption may mark the resolution of differences and a new departure in the ideological field. In the matter of appointments, particularly, the leadership has clearly been deadlocked: the post of chief editor of KOMMUNIST had remained unfilled for an unprecedented seven months, while the Central Committee's Propaganda Section has had no identified chief for over four years--nor a first deputy head, either, until recently.

Although the Central Committee decree on Belorussian ideological work is being presented as the centerpiece of a national campaign to intensify ideological work, it will also be read as a censure for Belorussian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member P.M. Masherov. The latter aspect of the decree is ironic since Masherov regularly

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outdistances other leaders in harping on ideological work and political orthodoxy. Belorussia is one of the least likely targets for accusations of neglecting ideological work, since it has been virtually free of scandals or public cases of ideological errors. Comments by Masherov specify that the censure was the work of the Secretariat--thus suggesting that Brezhnev organized the attack. Although Masherov has joined in the chorus of praise for Brezhnev in the last couple years, he has long been outspokenly independent and no Brezhnev protege.

The choice of PRAVDA first deputy chief editor V.G. Afanasyev for chief editor of KOMMUNIST ends a long deadlock existing since late January when A.G. Yegorov was removed amidst signs of disfavor and controversy.* In recent years, Afanasyev, presumably enjoying Brezhnev's confidence, has become one of the regime's most prolific and authoritative spokesmen on theory. However, his numerous articles do not clearly identify his stand in the present bitter philosophical and economic disputes, instead suggesting a cautious middle-of-the-road position reflecting the consensus of the Politburo.

In a possibly related decision, the vacuum in leadership of the Central Committee's Propaganda Section recently was partially filled. As revealed in an August ZHURNALIST account of a midyear meeting and confirmed in the 10 September PRAVDA, longtime Agitprop deputy head G.L. Smirnov has been promoted to first deputy head. Though Smirnov's political orientation is not clear, he played a key role in pressing the censure of the Belorussian party organization, apparently leading the commission to investigate Belorussia's ideological problems shortly before his promotion. He succeeds apparent moderate A.N. Yakovlev, who had been removed from his post and exiled to Canada as ambassador in mid-1973 after authoring a controversial November 1972 LITERARY GAZETTE article attacking Russophiles. The last identified head of Agitprop, V.I. Stepakov, had been ousted in mid-1970, and no successor has ever been publicly identified, although Ideology Secretary Demichev appears to act as chief in fact if not in title.

DECREE ON BELORUSSIA

The Central Committee decree on Belorussian ideological work was announced in the

31 August PRAVDA and, following customary practice, cited both positive and negative work. That the thrust was basically critical, however, was indicated by its complaints that some Belorussian organs had neglected ideological work and by its order that Belorussian leaders improve the choice of ideological cadres and end shortcomings. The negative interpretation was reinforced by details provided in First

* See the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 22-24.

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Secretary Masherov's long 13 September speech on the decree at a republic aktiv meeting. Although he went to great lengths to point out all the positive statements in the decree, he also admitted that in adopting the decree Moscow had repudiated as inadequate his own efforts to tighten up and had characterized the shortcomings in his domain as "serious."

As Masherov noted in this speech, published in the 14 September SOVIET BELORUSSIA, he had already thoroughly criticized ideological shortcomings at a 29-30 April 1974 Belorussian Central Committee plenum and had called for ideological tightening up. "Nevertheless," he said, "we have to admit that the CPSU Central Committee helped us see some existing shortcomings more sharply" and to see omissions in local work. Masherov mentioned that a commission had been sent from Moscow to investigate Belorussian ideological work. The commission apparently was headed by Agitprop deputy head G.L. Smirnov, who visited Belorussia about this time and spoke on current ideological problems at the 30 April republic plenum. After the commission's investigation, Masherov was called to the Central Committee Secretariat to report and, as Masherov remarked, the discussion in the Secretariat was marked by "very high party demandingness" and the "secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee and officials of Central Committee sections, while as a whole positively evaluating" the Belorussians' work, also made a number of criticisms. Masherov's specifying of the Secretariat makes Brezhnev's role in the decree clearer, since Brezhnev, as General Secretary, is in a position, both legally and politically, to dominate Secretariat decisions. The only other Politburo members in the Secretariat are Suslov and Brezhnev allies Kirilenko and Kulakov.

The new decree and Masherov's discussion of it specified few concrete shortcomings; the decree simply calls on the Belorussians to do everything better, giving the impression of nitpicking. Masherov mentioned only one specific charge raised by the Central Committee against the Belorussians: that labor absenteeism reached 56,000 for the year 1973 and rose to 30,000 for just the first half of 1974. Even Masherov's long 29 April plenum speech concentrated on ending administrative inefficiency, raising labor productivity and increasing ideological aggressiveness and cited few actual ideological mistakes. Indeed, under the tough ideological policies of Masherov and his predecessor Mazurov Belorussia has enjoyed a virtually spotless record as far as ideological shortcomings are concerned, and Masherov speeches have been notable for their consistent stress on intensified ideological struggle, more aggressive ideological training, suppression of local nationalism and prevention of economic abuses.

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AFANASYEV APPOINTMENT

The appointment of 52-year old philosopher Afanasyev as chief editor of KOMMUNIST was revealed in KOMMUNIST, No. 13, signed to press 5 September. He had not been listed on the board in issue No. 12, signed to press 13 August, thus dating his appointment in late August--at the same time that the decree on Belorussia was announced. The first issue of KOMMUNIST under Afanasyev carried the new Central Committee decree. Other members of the editorial board remain as before.

Afanasyev was specially favored in late 1968, when after several years as head of the scientific communism department of the Academy of Social Sciences he was named deputy chief editor of PRAVDA in charge of theory--a post created specially for him. In 1968-69, reflecting the leadership's alarm over revisionist trends, he concentrated on conservative themes, defending central planning, the leading role of the party and proletariat, and the primacy of the USSR in world communism. In mid-1970 he was promoted to first deputy chief editor of PRAVDA.

In recent years he has written numerous articles and books on subjects such as administration and management, economic reform and the scientific-technical revolution, but his writings appear to carefully expound middle-of-the-road positions apparently reflecting a consensus of the party leadership, rather than breaking any new ground. A notable November 1971 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article criticized both "conservatives" who resist cybernetics and also those who think computers can run the whole economy, and stated that some decentralization of economic management was necessary. His most recent notable articles were a January 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article which appeared pro-Brezhnev in arguing the need for a strong leader and only a minimum of collectivity,* and an 11 January 1974 PRAVDA article expounding on themes raised at the December 1973 Central Committee plenum, urging use of modern administrative methods and increased power for consumers to force improvement of product quality and assortment. In the PRAVDA article he cited all Brezhnev's controversial December plenum statements on asserting a "party style" and "party approach" in leading the economy, on adopting a "really scientific, party basis" for economic administration, and on warning against a "technocratic" approach. But he balanced all this by recalling Lenin's demand for separation of the functions of party and state and his warning against "petty interference" by the party in running the economy. Lenin's statements, he declared, retain their validity today and cases of such party interference still occur. Despite his prolific writings,

* See the TRENDS of 20 March 1974, page 19.

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however, his stance in the controversies between liberals and conservatives in the fields of philosophy and economics is not clear.

Judging by the publication dates given in the journal, the first issue of KOMMUNIST under Afanasyev was apparently assembled already last July but signed to press only on 5 September. Normally issues are prepared over a span of one to three weeks and signed to press only a few days later. Further, the 14-17 July dates would indicate that issue No. 13 had been prepared before issues No. 11 (prepared 11-19 July and signed to press 29 July) and No. 12 (prepared 1-10 August and signed to press 13 August). Errors in such matters are possible but extremely rare.

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NOTE

HOXHA ON U.S., SOVIET TIES: In a harshly worded speech, Albanian party chief Enver Hoxha has rejected any intention of establishing diplomatic relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union. His remarks, delivered 3 October on the eve of Peoples' Assembly elections, were directed mainly against alleged diplomatic overtures from Moscow and "traitors" and "agents" who favor better Moscow-Tirana ties. Hoxha noted that such elements had been "caught redhanded" and that the "iron broom is sweeping our ranks clean of them." In the same context he denied rumors that Albania was "split and gnawed at by the worm of dissension." These remarks and other indications seem to give substance to Western press reports that Defense Minister Beqir Balluku has been ousted for disagreeing with Hoxha's hardline stance toward Moscow. Balluku's activities have not been reported since 18 June, and his name was dropped from the list of Peoples' Assembly candidates. Hoxha also had particularly harsh words for Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, but he pointedly expressed interest in improved relations with neighbors Yugoslavia and Greece.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 SEPTEMBER - 6 OCTOBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2864 items)</u>	<u>Peking (769 items)</u>
GDR 25th Anniversary [Brezhnev Speeches in GDR	(1%) 11% PRC National Day (1%) 27%
Hungarian Party Leader Kadar in USSR [Brezhnev Interview with Hungarian Journalists	(--) 4% [Joint Editorial (--) 6%] UNGA Session (7%) 14%
PRC National Day Brezhnev Council of Ministers Speech Gromyko in Poland	(11%) 8% [Chiao Kuan-hua (--) 9%] Speech (--) 4% Gabon President Bongo (--) 9% in PRC (--) 7% PRC-Japan Air Service (2%) 7% (--) 5% Inauguration Criticism of Lin Piao (3%) 4% (--) 3% and Confucius

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.